— 172 —
      §13. Secondly, The Parts of pure Space are inseparable one from
the other; so that the Continuity cannot be separated, neither
really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one, to remove any part
of it from another, with which it is continued, even so much as in
Thought. To divide and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing
the parts one from another, to make two Superficies, where before
there was a Continuity: And to divide mentally, is to make in the
Mind two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity, and
consider them as removed one from the other; which can only be
done in things considered by the Mind, as capable of being sepa-
rated; and by separation, of acquiring new distinct Superficies,
which they then have not, but are capable of: But neither of these
ways of Separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, com-
patible to pure Space.
      ’Tis true, a Man may consider so much of such a Space, as is
answerable or commensurate to a Foot, without considering the
rest; which is indeed a partial Consideration, but not so much as
mental Separation, or Division; since a Man can no more mentally
divide, without considering two Superficies, separate one from the
— 173 —
other, than he can actually divide, without making two Superficies
disjoin’d one from the other: But a partial consideration is not
separating. A Man may consider Light in the Sun, without its
Heat; or Mobility in Body without its Extension, without thinking
of their separation. One is only a partial Consideration, terminating
in one alone; and the other is a Consideration of both, as existing
Locke Hum II, 13, §13, pp. 172-173