— 122 —
Few simple Ideas have Names.       §2. I think, it will be needless to enumerate all the particular
simple Ideas, belonging to each Sense. Nor indeed is it possible, if we
would, there being a great many more of them belonging to most of
the Senses, than we have Names for. The variety of Smells, which are
as many almost, if not more than Species of Bodies in the World, do
most of them want Names. Sweet and Stinking commonly serve our
turn for these Ideas, which in effect, is little more than to call them
pleasing or displeasing; though the smell of a Rose, and Violet,
both sweet, are certainly very distinct Ideas. Nor are the different
Tastes that by our Palates we receive Ideas of, much better provided
with Names. Sweet, Bitter, Sowr, Harsh, and Salt, are almost all the
Epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of Relishes,
which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of
Creatures, but in the different Parts of the same Plant, Fruit, or
Animal. The same may be said of Colours and Sounds. I shall there-
fore in the account of simple Ideas, I am here giving, content my self
to set down only such, as are most material to our present Purpose,
or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of, though they are
very frequently the Ingredients of our complex Ideas, amongst
which, I think, I may well account Solidity; which therefore I shall
treat of in the next Chapter.
Locke Hum II, 3, §2, p. 122