— 113 —
On this Hypothesis the Soul must have Ideas not derived from Sensation or Reflexion, of which there is no appearance.       §16. ’Tis true, we have sometimes instances of Perception,
whilst we are asleep, and retain the memory of those Thoughts: but
how extravagant and incoherent for the most part they are; how
little conformable to the Perfection and Order of a rational Being,
those who are acquainted with Dreams, need not be told. This I
would willingly be satisfied in, Whether the Soul, when it thinks
thus apart, and as it were separate from the Body, acts less ration-
ally than when conjointly with it, or no: If its separate Thoughts be
less rational, then these Men must say, That the Soul owes the
perfection of rational thinking to the Body: If it does not, ’tis a
wonder that our Dreams should be, for the most part, so frivolous
and irrational; and that the Soul should retain none of its more
rational Soliloquies and Meditations.
Locke Hum II, 1, §16, p. 113