— 109 —
It is not always conscious of it.       §11. I grant that the Soul in a waking Man is never without
thought, because it is the condition of being awake: But whether
— 110 —
sleeping without dreaming be not an Affection of the whole Man,
Mind as well as Body, may be worth a waking Man’s Consideration;
it being hard to conceive, that any thing should think, and not be
conscious of it. If the Soul doth think in a sleeping Man, without being
conscious of it, I ask, whether, during such thinking, it has any
Pleasure or Pain, or be capable of Happiness or Misery? I am sure
the Man is not, no more than the Bed or Earth he lies on. For to be
happy or miserable without being conscious of it, seems to me
utterly inconsistent and impossible. Or if it be possible, that the
Soul can, whilst the Body is sleeping, have its Thinking, Enjoy-
ments, and Concerns, its Pleasure or Pain apart, which the Man is
not conscious of, nor partakes in: It is certain, that Socrates asleep,
and Socrates awake, is not the same Person; but his Soul when he
sleeps, and Socrates the Man consisting of Body and Soul when he is
waking, are two Persons: Since waking Socrates, has no Knowledge
of, or Concernment for that Happiness, or Misery of his Soul,
which it enjoys alone by it self whilst he sleeps, without perceiving
any thing of it; no more than he has for the Happiness, or Misery of
a Man in the Indies, whom he knows not. For if we take wholly
away all Consciousness of our Actions and Sensations, especially of
Pleasure and Pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will
be hard to know wherein to place personal Identity.
Locke Hum II, 1, §11, pp. 109-110