— 86 —
Identity an Idea not innate.       §4. If Identity (to instance in that alone) be a native Impression;
and consequently so clear and obvious to us, that we must needs
know it even from our Cradles; I would gladly be resolved, by one
of Seven, or Seventy Years old, Whether a Man, being a Creature,
consisting of Soul and Body, be the same Man, when his Body is
changed? Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having had the same
Soul, were the same Man, though they lived several Ages asunder?
Nay, Whether the Cock too, which had the same Soul, were not
the same with both of them? Whereby, perhaps, it will appear, that
our Idea of sameness, is not so settled and clear, as to deserve to be
thought innate in us. For if those innate Ideas, are not clear and
distinct, so as to be universally known, and naturally agreed on,
they cannot be the Subjects of universal, and undoubted Truths;
but will be the unavoidable Occasion of perpetual Uncertainty.
For, I suppose, every one’s Idea of Identity, will not be the same,
that Pythagoras, and Thousands others of his Followers, have:
And which then shall be the true? Which innate? Or are there two
different Ideas of Identity, both innate?
Locke Hum I, 4, §4, p. 86