— 85 —
      §3. It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, is certainly
(if there be any such) an innate Principle. But can any one think, or
will any one say, that Impossibility and Identity, are two innate Ideas?
Are they such as all Mankind have, and bring into the World with
them? And are they those, that are the first in Children, and ante-
cedent to all acquired ones? If they are innate, they must needs be so.
Hath a Child an Idea of Impossibility and Identity, before it has of
White or Black; Sweet or Bitter? And is it from the Knowledge of this
Principle, that it concludes, that Wormwood rubb’d on the Nipple,
hath not the same Taste, that it used to receive from thence? Is it the
actual Knowledge of impossibile est idem esse, et non esse, that makes a
Child distinguish between its Mother and a Stranger; or, that makes
it fond of the one, and fly the other? Or does the Mind regulate
it self, and its assent by Ideas, that it never yet had? Or the
— 86 —
Understanding draw Conclusions from Principles, which it never
yet knew or understood? The Names Impossibility and Identity, stand
for two Ideas, so far from being innate, or born with us, that I think
it requires great Care and Attention, to form them right in our
Understandings. They are so far from being brought into the
World with us; so remote from the thoughts of Infancy and Child-
hood, that, I believe, upon Examination, it will be found, that
many grown Men want them.
Locke Hum I, 4, §3, pp. 85-86