— 63 —
And so not innate.       §26. Though therefore there be several general Propositions,
that meet with constant and ready assent, as soon as proposed to
Men grown up, who have attained the use of more general and
abstract Ideas, and Names standing for them: yet they not being to
be found in those of tender Years, who nevertheless know other
things, they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent
Persons, and so by no means can be supposed innate: It being
impossible, that any Truth which is innate (if there were any such)
should be unknown, at least to any one, who knows any thing else.
Since, if they are innate Truths, they must be innate thoughts:
there being nothing a Truth in the Mind, that it has never thought
on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any innate Truths, they must
necessarily be the first of any thought on; the first that appear there.
Locke Hum I, 2, §26, p. 63