— 52 —
      §10. ’Twill here perhaps be said, That Mathematical Demon-
strations, and other Truths, that are not innate, are not assented to,
as soon as propos’d, wherein they are distinguish’d from these
Maxims, and other innate Truths. I shall have occasion to speak of
Assent upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I
shall here only, and that very readily, allow, That these Maxims,
and Mathematical Demonstrations are in this different; That the
one has need of Reason using of Proofs, to make them out, and to
gain our Assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without
any the least reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal beg
leave to observe, That it lays open the Weakness of this Subterfuge,
which requires the Use of Reason for the Discovery of these general
Truths: Since it must be confessed, that in their Discovery, there is
no Use made of reasoning at all. And I think those who give this
Answer, will not be forward to affirm, That the Knowledge of this
Maxim, That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, is a
deduction of our Reason. For this would be to destroy that Bounty
of Nature, they seem so fond of, whilst they make the Knowledge of
those Principles to depend on the labour of our Thoughts. For all
Reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires Pains and
Application. And how can it with any tolerable Sence be suppos’d,
that what was imprinted by Nature, as the Foundation and Guide
of our Reason, should need the Use of Reason to discover it?
Locke Hum I, 2, §10, p. 52