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Traditional Revelation much less.
      §6. Thus far a Man has use of Reason, and ought to hearken to it,
even in immediate and original Revelation, where it is supposed to be
made to himself: But to all those who pretend not to immediate
Revelation, but are required to pay Obedience, and to receive the
Truths revealed to others, which, by the Tradition of Writings, or
Word of Mouth, are conveyed down to them, Reason has a great
deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive
them. For Matter of Faith being only Divine Revelation, and nothing
else, Faith, as we use the Word, (called commonly, Divine Faith)
has to do with no Propositions, but those which are supposed to be
divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those, who make Revela-
tion alone the sole Object of Faith, can say, That it is a Matter of
Faith, and not of Reason, to believe, That such or such a Proposition,
to be found in such or such a Book, is of Divine Inspiration; unless
it be revealed, That that Proposition, or all in that Book, was
communicated by Divine Inspiration. Without such a Revelation,
the believing, or not believing that Proposition, or Book, to be
of Divine Authority, can never be Matter of Faith, but Matter of
Reason; and such, as I must come to an Assent to, only by the use of
my Reason, which can never require or enable me to believe that,
which is contrary to it self: It being impossible for Reason, ever to
procure any Assent to that, which to it self appears unreasonable.
      In all Things therefore, where we have clear Evidence from our
Ideas, and those Principles of Knowledge, I have above mentioned,
Reason is the proper Judge; and Revelation, though it may in consent-
ing with it, confirm its Dictates, yet cannot in such Cases, invalidate
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its Decrees: Nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident
Sentence of Reason, to quit it, for the contrary Opinion, under a Pretence that
it is Matter of Faith; which can have no Authority against the plain
and clear Dictates of Reason.
Locke Hum IV, 18, §6, pp. 693-694