— 690 —
Traditional Revelation may make us know Propositions knowable also by Reason, but not with the same certainty that Reason doth.
      §4. Secondly, I say, that the same Truths may be discovered, and con-
veyed down from Revelation, which are discoverable to us by Reason, and by
those Ideas we naturally may have. So GOD might, by Revelation,
discover the Truth of any Proposition in Euclid; as well as Men, by
the natural use of their Faculties, come to make the discovery them-
selves. In all Things of this Kind, there is little need or use of
Revelation, GOD having furnished us with natural, and surer means
to arrive at the Knowledge of them. For whatsoever Truth we
come to the clear discovery of, from the Knowledge and Contem-
plation of our own Ideas, will always be certainer to us, than those
— 691 —
which are conveyed to us by Traditional Revelation. For the Know-
ledge, we have, that this Revelation came at first from GOD, can
never be so sure, as the Knowledge we have from the clear and
distinct Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our own
Ideas, v.g. If it were revealed some Ages since, That the three Angles
of a Triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to the
Truth of that Proposition, upon the Credit of the Tradition, that it
was revealed: But that would never amount to so great a Certainty,
as the Knowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my own
Ideas of two right Angles, and the three Angles of a Triangle. The
like holds in matter of Fact, knowable by our Senses, v.g. the History
of the Deluge is conveyed to us by Writings, which had their
Original from Revelation: And yet no Body, I think, will say, he
has as certain and clear a Knowledge of the Flood, as Noah that saw
it; or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive, and
seen it. For he has no greater an assurance than that of his Senses,
that it is writ in the Book supposed writ by Moses inspired: But he
has not so great an assurance, that Moses writ that Book, as if he had
seen Moses write it. So that the assurance of its being a Revelation,
is less still than the assurance of his Senses.
Locke Hum IV, 18, §4, pp. 690-691