— 685 —
To supply the narrowness of this, we have nothing but Judgment upon probable reasoning.
      §16. Secondly, There are other Ideas, whose Agreement, or Dis-
agreement, can no otherwise be judged of, but by the intervention
of others, which have not a certain Agreement with the Extremes,
but an usual or likely one: And in these it is, that the Judgment is
properly exercised, which is the acquiescing of the Mind, that any
Ideas do agree, by comparing them with such probable Mediums.
This, though it never amounts to Knowledge, no not to that which
is the lowest degree of it: yet sometimes the intermediate Ideas tie
the Extremes so firmly together, and the Probability is so clear and
strong, that Assent as necessarily follows it, as Knowledge does
Demonstration. The great Excellency and Use of the Judgment, is
to observe Right, and take a true estimate of the force and weight
of each Probability; and then casting them up all right together,
chuse that side, which has the over-balance.
Locke Hum IV, 17, §16, p. 685