— 675 —
      Of what use then are Syllogisms? I answer, Their chief and main
use is in the Schools, where Men are allowed without Shame to deny
the Agreement of Ideas, that do manifestly agree; or out of the Schools
to those, who from thence have learned without shame to deny the
connexion of Ideas, which even to themselves is visible. But to an
ingenuous Searcher after Truth, who has no other aim, but to find
it, there is no need of any such Form, to force the allowing of the
Inference: the Truth and reasonableness of it is better seen in
ranging of the Ideas in a simple and plain order; And hence it is, that
Men in their own inquiries after Truth never use Syllogisms to con-
vince themselves, (or in teaching others to instruct willing Learners).
Because, before they can put them into a Syllogism they must see the
connexion, that is between the intermediate Idea, and the two other
Ideas it is set between, and applied to, to shew their Agreement, and
when they see that, they see whether the inference be good or no,
and so Syllogism comes too late to settle it. For to make use again of
the former Instance; I ask whether the Mind considering the Idea
of Justice, placed as an intermediate Idea between the punishment of
Men, and the guilt of the punished, (and till it does so consider it,
the Mind cannot make use of it as a medius terminus) does not as
plainly see the force and strength of the Inference, as when it is
formed into Syllogism. To shew it in a very plain and easy Example;
let Animal be the intermediate Idea or medius terminus that the Mind
makes use of to shew the connexion of Homo and vivens: I ask whether
the Mind does not more readily and plainly see that connexion, in
the simple and proper Position of the connecting Idea in the middle;
thus,
Homo—Animal—vivens,

Than in this perplexed one,
Animal—vivens—Homo—Animal.

Which is the Position these Ideas have in a Syllogism, to shew the
connexion between Homo and vivens by the intervention of Animal.
Indeed Syllogism is thought to be of necessary use, even to the
Lovers of Truth, to show them the Fallacies, that are often con-
cealed in florid, witty, or involved Discourses. But that this is a
mistake will appear, if we consider, that the Reason why sometimes
Men, who sincerely aim at Truth, are imposed upon by such loose,
— 676 —
and as they are called Rhetorical Discourses, is that their Phancies
being struck with some lively metaphorical Representations, they
neglect to observe, or do not easily perceive what are the true Ideas,
upon which the Inference depends. Now to shew such Men the
weakness of such an Argumentation, there needs no more but to
strip it of the superfluous Ideas, which blended and confounded with
those on which the Inference depends, seem to shew a connexion,
where there is none; or at least do hinder the discovery of the want
of it; and then to lay the naked Ideas on which the force of the Argu-
mentation depends, in their due order, in which Position the Mind
taking a view of them, sees what connexion they have, and so is
able to judge of the Inference, without any need of a Syllogism at all.
Locke Hum IV, 17, §4, pp. 675-676