— 637 —
Particular Propositions concerning Existence are knowable.
      §13. By which it appears, that there are two sorts of Propositions.
1º. There is one sort of Propositions concerning the Existence of any
thing answerable to such an Idea: as having the Idea of an Elephant,
Phoenix, Motion, or an Angel, in my Mind, the first and natural
enquiry is, Whether such a thing does any where exist? And this
— 638 —
Knowledge is only of Particulars. No existence of any thing without
us, but only of GOD, can certainly be known farther than our
Senses inform us. 2º. There is another sort of Propositions, wherein is
expressed the Agreement, or Disagreement of our abstract Ideas,
and their dependence one on another. Such Propositions may be
universal and certain. So having the Idea of GOD and my self, of
Fear and Obedience, I cannot but be sure that GOD is to be feared
and obeyed by me: And this Proposition will be certain, concerning
Man in general, if I have made an abstract Idea of such a Species,
whereof I am one particular. But yet this Proposition, how certain
soever, That Men ought to fear and obey GOD, proves not to me
the Existence of Men in the World, but will be true of all such Crea-
tures, whenever they do exist: Which certainty of such general
Propositions, depends on the Agreement or Disagreement is to be
discovered in those abstract Ideas.
Locke Hum IV, 11, §13, pp. 637-638