— 636 —
Folly to expect demonstration in every thing.
      §10. Whereby yet we may observe, how foolish and vain a thing
it is, for a Man of narrow Knowledge, who having Reason given
him to judge of the different evidence and probability of Things,
and to be sway’d accordingly; how vain, I say, it is to expect Demon-
stration and Certainty in things not capable of it; and refuse Assent to
very rational Propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear
Truths, because they cannot be made out so evident, as to sur-
mount every the least (I will not say Reason, but) pretence of
doubting. He that in the ordinary Affairs of Life, would admit of
nothing but direct plain Demonstration, would be sure of nothing,
in this World, but of perishing quickly. The wholesomness of his
Meat or Drink would not give him reason to venture on it: And I
would fain know, what ’tis he could do upon such grounds, as were
capable of no Doubt, no Objection.
Locke Hum IV, 11, §10, p. 636