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This though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be called Knowledge, and proves the existence of things without us.
      §3. The notice we have by our Senses, of the existing of Things without
us, though it be not altogether so certain, as our intuitive Know-
ledge, or the Deductions of our Reason, employ’d about the clear
abstract Ideas of our own Minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves
the name of Knowledge. If we persuade our selves, that our Faculties
act and inform us right, concerning the existence of those Objects
that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: For
I think no body can, in earnest, be so sceptical, as to be uncertain of
the Existence of those Things which he sees and feels. At least, he
that can doubt so far,(whatever he may have with his own Thoughts)
will never have any Controversie with me; since he can never be
sure I say any thing contrary to his Opinion. As to my self, I think
GOD has given me assurance enough of the Existence of Things
without me: since by their different application, I can produce in
my self both Pleasure and Pain, which is one great Concernment of
my present state. This is certain, the confidence that our Faculties
do not herein deceive us, is the greatest assurance we are capable
of, concerning the Existence of material Beings. For we cannot act
any thing, but by our Faculties; nor talk of Knowledge it self, but
by the help of those Faculties, which are fitted to apprehend even
what Knowledge is. But besides the assurance we have from our
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Senses themselves, that they do not err in the Information they
give us, of the Existence of Things without us, when they are
affected by them, we are farther confirmed in this assurance, by
other concurrent Reasons.
Locke Hum IV, 11, §3, pp. 631-632