— 590 —
Wherein lies the general Certainty of Propositions.
      §16. To conclude, General Propositions, of what kind soever, are
then only capable of Certainty, when the Terms used in them, stand
for such Ideas, whose agreement or disagreement, as there expressed,
is capable to be discovered by us. And we are then certain of their
Truth or Falshood, when we perceive the Ideas the Terms stand for,
to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one
— 591 —
of another. Whence we may take notice, that general Certainty is
never to be found but in our Ideas. Whenever we go to seek it else-
where in Experiment, or Observations without us, our Knowledge
goes not beyond particulars. ’Tis the contemplation of our own
abstract Ideas, that alone is able to afford us general Knowledge.
Locke Hum IV, 6, §16, pp. 590-591