— 577 —
Answered, real Truth is about Ideas agreeing to Things.
      §8. Though what has been said in the fore-going Chapter, to
distinguish real from imaginary Knowledge, might suffice here, in
answer to this Doubt, to distinguish real Truth from chimerical, or
(if you please,) barely nominal, they depending both on the same
foundation; yet it may not be amiss here again to consider, that
though our Words signifie nothing but our Ideas, yet being designed
by them to signifie Things, the Truth they contain, when put into
Propositions, will be only Verbal, when they stand for Ideas in the
Mind, that have not an agreement with the reality of Things. And
therefore Truth, as well as Knowledge, may well come under the
distinction of Verbal and Real; that being only verbal Truth, wherein
Terms are joined according to the agreement or disagreement of the
— 578 —
Ideas they stand for, without regarding whether our Ideas are such,
as really have, or are capable of having an Existence in Nature. But
then it is they contain real Truth, when these signs are joined, as our
Ideas agree; and when our Ideas are such, as we know are capable of
having an Existence in Nature: which in Substances we cannot
know, but by knowing that such have existed.
Locke Hum IV, 5, §8, pp. 577-578