— 507 —
How in Modes and Relations.
      §33. In Modes and Relations generally, we are liable only to the
four first of these Inconveniencies, (viz.) 1. I may have in my
Memory the Names of Modes, as Gratitude, or Charity, and yet not
have any precise Ideas annexed in my Thoughts to those Names.
2. I may have Ideas, and not know the Names that belong to them;
v.g. I may have the Idea of a Man’s drinking, till his Colour and
Humour be altered, till his Tongue trips, and his Eyes look red,
and his Feet fail him; and yet not know, that it is to be called
Drunkenness. 3. I may have the Ideas of Vertues, or Vices, and Names
also, but apply them amiss: v.g. When I apply the Name Frugality
to that Idea which others call and signify by this sound, Covetousness.
4. I may use any of those names with inconstancy. 5. But in Modes
and Relations, I cannot have Ideas disagreeing to the Existence of
Things: for Modes being complex Ideas, made by the Mind at
pleasure; and Relation being but my way of considering, or com-
paring two Things together, and so also an Idea of my own making,
these Ideas can scarce be found to disagree with any Thing existing;
since they are not in the Mind, as the Copies of Things regularly
made by Nature, nor as Properties inseparably flowing from the
internal Constitution or Essence of any Substance; but, as it were,
Patterns lodg’d in my Memory, with names annexed to them, to
denominate Actions and Relations by, as they come to exist. But
the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to my Con-
ceptions; and so using Words in a different sense from other People,
I am not understood, but am thought to have wrong Ideas of them,
— 508 —
when I give wrong Names to them. Only if I put in my Ideas of
mixed Modes or Relations, any inconsistent Ideas together, I fill my
Head also with Chimaeras; since such Ideas, if well examined, cannot
so much as exist in the Mind, much less any real Being, be ever
denominated from them.
Locke Hum III, 10, §33, pp. 507-508