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Species of artificial things less confused than natural.       §40. From what has been before said, we may see the reason, why,
in the Species of artificial Things, there is generally less confusion and un-
certainty, than in natural. Because an artificial Thing being a pro-
duction of Man, which the Artificer design’d, and therefore well
knows the Idea of, the name of it is supposed to stand for no other
Idea, nor to import any other Essence, than what is certainly to
be known, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the Idea, or
Essence, of the several sorts of artificial Things, consisting, for the
most part, in nothing but the determinate Figure of sensible Parts;
and sometimes Motion depending thereon, which the Artificer
fashions in Matter, such as he finds for his Turn, it is not beyond
the reach of our Faculties to attain a certain Idea thereof; and so
settle the signification of the Names, whereby the Species of
— 465 —
artificial Things are distinguished, with less Doubt, Obscurity, and
Equivocation, than we can in Things natural, whose differences and
Operations depend upon Contrivances, beyond the reach of our
Discoveries.
Locke Hum III, 6, §40, pp. 464-465