— 410 —
      §4. Thirdly, But yet granting this also feasible; (which I think is
not,) yet a distinct Name for every particular Thing, would not be of any
great use for the improvement of Knowledge: which though founded
in particular Things, enlarges it self by general Views; to which,
Things reduced into sorts under general Names, are properly
subservient. These, with the Names belonging to them, come
within some compass, and do not multiply every Moment, beyond
what, either the Mind can contain, or Use requires. And therefore
in these Men have for the most part stopp’d: but yet not so, as
to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular Things, by
appropriated Names, where Convenience demands it. And there-
fore in their own Species, which they have most to do with, and
wherein they have often occasion to mention particular Persons;
they make use of proper Names, and there distinct Individuals have
distinct Denominations.
Locke Hum III, 3, §4, p. 410