— 393 —
More properly to be called Right or Wrong.       §26. Upon the whole matter, I think, That our Ideas, as they are
considered by the Mind, either in reference to the proper signifi-
cation of their Names; or in reference to the reality of Things, may
— 394 —
very fitly be called right, or wrong Ideas, according as they agree, or
disagree to those Patterns to which they are referred. But if any one
had rather call them true, or false, ’tis fit he use a liberty which every
one has, to call Things by those Names he thinks best; though in
propriety of Speech, Truth, or Falshood, will, I think, scarce agree to
them, but as they, some way or other, virtually contain in them
some mental Proposition. The Ideas that are in a Man’s Mind,
simply considered, cannot be wrong, unless complex ones, wherein
inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other Ideas are in them-
selves right; and the knowledge about them right and true Know-
ledge: but when we come to refer them to any thing, as to their
Patterns and Archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as
far as they disagree with such Archetypes.
Locke Hum II, 32, §26, pp. 393-394