— 393 —
Ideas when false.       §25. To conclude, a Man having no notion of any Thing with-
out him, but by the Idea he has of it in his Mind (which Idea, he has
a power to call by what Name he pleases) he may, indeed, make an
Idea neither answering the reality of Things, nor agreeing to the
Ideas commonly signified by other Peoples Words; but cannot make
a wrong, or false Idea of a Thing, which is no otherwise known to
him, but by the Idea he has of it. v.g. When I frame an Idea of the
Legs, Arms, and Body of a Man, and join to this a Horse’s Head and
Neck, I do not make a false Idea of any thing; because it represents
nothing without me. But when I call it a Man, or Tartar, and ima-
gine it either to represent some real Being without me, or to be the
same Idea, that others call by the same name; in either of these
cases, I may err. And upon this account it is, that it comes to be
termed a false Idea; though, indeed, the falshood lie not in the Idea,
but in that tacit mental Proposition, wherein a conformity and
resemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having
framed such an Idea in my Mind, without thinking, either that
Existence, or the name Man or Tartar, belongs to it, I will call it
Man, or Tartar, I may be justly thought fantastical in the Naming;
but not erroneous in any Judgment; nor the Idea any way false.
Locke Hum II, 32, §25, p. 393