— 389 —
Though one Mans Idea of Blue, should be different from anothers.       §15. Neither would it carry any Imputation of Falshood to our
simple Ideas, if by the different Structure of our Organs, it were so
ordered, That the same Object should produce in several Men’s Minds
different Ideas at the same time; v.g. if the Idea, that a Violet pro-
duced in one Man’s Mind by his Eyes, were the same that a Mari-
gold produced in another Man’s, and vice versâ. For since this could
never be known: because one Man’s Mind could not pass into
another Man’s Body, to perceive, what Appearances were pro-
duced by those Organs; neither the Ideas hereby, nor the Names,
would be at all confounded, or any Falshood be in either. For all
Things, that had the Texture of a Violet, producing constantly the
Idea, which he called Blue; and those which had the Texture of a
Marigold, producing constantly the Idea, which he as constantly
called Yellow, whatever those Appearances were in his Mind; he
would be able as regularly to distinguish Things for his Use by
those Appearances, and understand, and signify those distinctions,
marked by the Names Blue and Yellow, as if the Appearances, or
Ideas in his Mind, received from those two Flowers, were exactly
the same, with the Ideas in other Men’s Minds. I am nevertheless
very apt to think, that the sensible Ideas, produced by any Object
in different Men’s Minds, are most commonly very near and un-
discernibly alike. For which Opinion, I think, there might be many
Reasons offered: but that being besides my present Business, I shall
not trouble my Reader with them; but only mind him, that the
contrary Supposition, if it could be proved, is of little use, either
for the Improvement of our Knowledge, or Conveniency of Life;
and so we need not trouble our selves to examine it.
Locke Hum II, 32, §15, p. 389