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First, Simple Ideas in this sense not false, and why.       §14. First, Our simple Ideas, being barely such Perceptions, as
God has fitted us to receive, and given Power to external Objects
to produce in us by established Laws, and Ways, suitable to his
Wisdom and Goodness, though incomprehensible to us, their
Truth consists in nothing else, but in such Appearances, as are
produced in us, and must be suitable to those Powers, he has placed
in external Objects, or else they could not be produced in us: And
thus answering those Powers, they are what they should be, true
Ideas. Nor do they become liable to any Imputation of Falshood, if
the Mind (as in most Men I believe it does) judges these Ideas to be
in the Things themselves. For God in his Wisdom, having set them
as Marks of Distinction in Things, whereby we may be able to
discern one Thing from another; and so chuse any of them for our
uses, as we have Occasion, it alters not the Nature of our simple
Idea, whether we think, that the Idea of Blue, be in the Violet it self,
or in our Mind only; and only the Power of producing it by the
Texture of its Parts, reflecting the Particles of Light, after a certain
Manner, to be in the Violet it self. For that Texture in the Object,
by a regular and constant operation, producing the same Idea of
Blue in us, it serves us to distinguish, by our Eyes, that from any
other Thing, whether that distinguishing Mark, as it is really in
the Violet, be only a peculiar Texture of Parts, or else that very
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Colour, the Idea whereof (which is in us) is the exact resemblance.
And it is equally from that Appearance, to be denominated Blue,
whether it be that real Colour, or only a peculiar Texture in it, that
causes in us that Idea: Since the Name Blue notes properly nothing,
but that Mark of Distinction, that is in a Violet, discernible only by
our Eyes, whatever it consists in, that being beyond our Capacities
distinctly to know, and, perhaps, would be of less use to us, if we
had Faculties to discern.
Locke Hum II, 32, §14, pp. 388-389