— 386 —
      §8. But this abstract Idea, being something in the Mind between
the thing that exists, and the name that is given to it; it is in our
Ideas, that both the Rightness of our Knowledge, and the Propriety
or Intelligibleness of our Speaking consists. And hence it is, that
Men are so forward to suppose, that the abstract Ideas they have
in their Minds, are such, as agree to the Things existing without
them, to which they are referr’d; and are the same also, to which
the Names they give them, do by the Use and Propriety of that
Language belong. For without this double Conformity of their Ideas,
they find, they should both think amiss of Things in themselves,
and talk of them unintelligibly to others.
Locke Hum II, 32, §8, p. 386