— 366 —
Confusion without reference to Names, hardly conceivable.       §10. By what has been said, we may observe how much Names, as
supposed steady signs of Things, and by their difference to stand
— 367 —
for, and keep Things distinct, that in themselves are different, are
the occasion of denominating Ideas distinct or confused, by a secret and
unobserved reference, the Mind makes of its Ideas to such Names.
This, perhaps, will be fuller understood, after what I say of Words,
in the Third Book, has been read and considered. But without
taking notice of such a reference of Ideas to distinct Names, as the
signs of distinct Things, it will be hard to say what a confused Idea is.
And therefore when a Man designs, by any Name, a sort of Things,
or any one particular Thing, distinct from all others, the complex
Idea he annexes to that Name, is the more distinct, the more
particular the Ideas are, and the greater and more determinate the
number and order of them is, whereof it is made up. For the more
it has of these, the more has it still of the perceivable differences,
whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all Ideas belonging to
other Names, even those that approach nearest to it, and thereby
all confusion with them is avoided.
Locke Hum II, 29, §10, pp. 366-367