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Confusion of Ideas, is in reference to their Names.       §6. To remove this difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright,
what it is, that makes the confusion, Ideas are at any time chargeable
with, we must consider, that Things ranked under distinct Names,
are supposed different enough to be distinguished, that so each
sort, by its peculiar Name, may be marked, and discoursed of apart,
upon any occasion: And there is nothing more evident, than that
the greatest part of different Names, are supposed to stand for
different Things. Now every Idea a Man has, being visibly what it
is, and distinct from all other Ideas but it self, that which makes it
confused is, when it is such, that it may as well be called by another
Name, as that which it is expressed by, the difference which keeps
the Things (to be ranked under those two different Names)
distinct, and makes some of them belong rather to the one, and
some of them to the other of those Names, being left out; and so the
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distinction, which was intended to be kept up by those different
Names, is quite lost.
Locke Hum II, 29, §6, pp. 364-365