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Moral Rules.       §6. Of these Moral Rules, or Laws, to which Men generally
refer, and by which they judge of the Rectitude or Pravity of their
Actions, there seem to me to be three sorts, with their three different
Enforcements, or Rewards and Punishments. For since it would be
utterly in vain, to suppose a Rule set to the free Actions of Man,
without annexing to it some Enforcement of Good and Evil, to
determine his Will, we must, where-ever we suppose a Law, suppose
also some Reward or Punishment annexed to that Law. It would be
in vain for one intelligent Being, to set a Rule to the Actions of
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another, if he had it not in his Power, to reward the compliance
with, and punish deviation from his Rule, by some Good and Evil,
that is not the natural product and consequence of the Action it
self. For that being a natural Convenience, or Inconvenience,
would operate of it self without a Law. This, if I mistake not, is the
true nature of all Law, properly so called.
Locke Hum II, 28, §6, pp. 351-352