— 350 —
Moral.       §4. Fourthly, There is another sort of Relation, which is the
Conformity, or Disagreement, Men’s voluntary Actions have to a
Rule, to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of:
which, I think, may be called Moral Relation; as being that, which
— 351 —
denominates our Moral Actions, and deserves well to be examined,
there being no part of Knowledge wherein we should be more
careful to get determined Ideas, and avoid, as much as may be,
Obscurity and Confusion. Humane Actions, when with their
various Ends, Objects, Manners, and Circumstances, they are
framed into distinct complex Ideas, are, as has been shewn, so many
mixed Modes, a great part whereof have Names annexed to them.
Thus supposing Gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and
return Kindness received; Polygamy to be the having more Wives
than one at once: when we frame these Notions thus in our Minds,
we have there so many determined Ideas of mixed Modes. But this is
not all that concerns our Actions; it is not enough to have deter-
mined Ideas of them, and to know what Names belong to such and
such Combinations of Ideas. We have a farther and greater Con-
cernment, and that is, to know whether such Actions so made up,
are morally good, or bad.
Locke Hum II, 28, §4, pp. 350-351