— 347 —
      §27. I am apt enough to think I have in treating of this Subject
made some Suppositions that will look strange to some Readers,
and possibly they are so in themselves. But yet I think, they are
such, as are pardonable in this ignorance we are in of the Nature of
that thinking thing, that is in us, and which we look on as our
selves. Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to a certain
System of fleeting Animal Spirits; or whether it could, or could not
perform its Operations of Thinking and Memory out of a Body
organized as ours is; and whether it has pleased God, that no one
such Spirit shall ever be united to any but one such Body, upon the
right Constitution of whose Organs its Memory should depend, we
might see the Absurdity of some of those Suppositions I have made.
But taking, as we ordinarily now do, (in the dark concerning these
Matters) the Soul of a Man, for an immaterial Substance, independent
from Matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the Nature
of things, be no Absurdity at all, to suppose, that the same Soul may,
at different times be united to different Bodies, and with them make
up, for that time, one Man; As well as we suppose a part of a Sheep’s
Body yesterday should be a part of a Man’s Body tomorrow, and in that
union make a vital part of Meliboeus himself as well as it did of his Ram.
Locke Hum II, 27, §27, p. 347