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Person a Forensick Term.       §26. Person, as I take it, is the name for this self: Where-ever a
Man finds, what he calls himself, there I think another may say is the
same Person. It is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their
Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law,
and Happiness and Misery. This personality extends it self beyond
present Existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it
becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to it self
past Actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason,
that it does the present. All which is founded in a concern for
Happiness the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness, that
which is conscious of Pleasure and Pain, desiring, that that self, that
is conscious, should be happy. And therefore whatever past Actions
it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present self by conscious-
ness, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been
done: And to receive Pleasure or Pain; i.e. Reward or Punishment,
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on the account of any such Action, is all one, as to be made happy or
miserable in its first being, without any demerit at all. For suppos-
ing a Man punish’d now, for what he had done in another Life,
whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all, what
difference is there between that Punishment, and being created
miserable? And therefore conformable to this, the Apostle tells us,
that at the Great Day, when every one shall receive according to his
doings, the secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open. cf. 1 Cor. 14: 25 and 2 Cor. 5: 10. The Sentence shall
be justified by the consciousness all Persons shall have, that they
themselves in what Bodies soever they appear, or what Substances
soever that consciousness adheres to, are the same, that committed
those Actions, and deserve that Punishment for them.
Locke Hum II, 27, §26, pp. 346-347