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Consciousness alone makes self.       §23. Nothing but consciousness can unite remote Existences into
the same Person, the Identity of Substance will not do it. For what-
ever Substance there is, however framed, without consciousness,
there is no Person: And a Carcase may be a Person, as well as any
sort of Substance be so without consciousness.
      Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses
acting the same Body, the one constantly by Day, the other by
Night; and on the other side the same consciousness acting by
Intervals two distinct Bodies: I ask in the first case, Whether the
Day and the Night-man would not be two as distinct Persons, as
Socrates and Plato; and whether in the second case, there would not
be one Person in two distinct Bodies, as much as one Man is the
same in two distinct clothings. Nor is it at all material to say, that
this same, and this distinct consciousness in the cases above-mentioned,
is owing to the same and distinct immaterial Substances, bringing
it with them to those Bodies, which whether true or no, alters not
the case: Since ’tis evident the personal Identity would equally be
determined by the consciousness, whether that consciousness were
annexed to some individual immaterial Substance or no. For grant-
ing that the thinking Substance in Man must be necessarily
suppos’d immaterial, ’tis evident, that immaterial thinking thing
may sometimes part with its past consciousness, and be restored to
it again, as appears in the forgetfulness Men often have of their
past Actions, and the Mind many times recovers the memory of a
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past consciousness, which it had lost for twenty Years together.
Make these intervals of Memory and Forgetfulness to take their
turns regularly by Day and Night, and you have two Persons with
the same immaterial Spirit, as much as in the former instance two
Persons with the same Body. So that self is not determined by Iden-
tity or Diversity of Substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only
by Identity of consciousness.
Locke Hum II, 27, §23, pp. 344-345