— 343 —
Difference between Identity of Man and Person.       §21. But yet ’tis hard to conceive, that Socrates the same indivi-
dual Man should be two Persons. To help us a little in this, we must
consider what is meant by Socrates, or the same individual Man.
      First, It must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking
Substance: In short, the same numerical Soul, and nothing else.
      Secondly, Or the same Animal, without any regard to an im-
material Soul.
      Thirdly, Or the same immaterial Spirit united to the same Animal.
      Now take which of these Suppositions you please, it is impossible
to make personal Identity to consist in any thing but consciousness;
or reach any farther than that does.
      For by the First of them, it must be allowed possible that a Man
born of different Women, and in distant times, may be the same
Man. A way of speaking, which whoever admits, must allow it
possible, for the same Man to be two distinct Persons, as any two
that have lived in different Ages without the knowledge of one
anothers Thoughts.
      By the Second and Third, Socrates in this Life, and after it, cannot
be the same Man any way, but by the same consciousness; and so
making Humane Identity to consist in the same thing wherein we
place Personal Identity, there will be no difficulty to allow the same
Man to be the same Person. But then they who place Humane
Identity in consciousness only, and not in something else, must
consider how they will make the Infant Socrates the same Man with
Socrates after the Resurrection. But whatsoever to some Men makes
a Man, and consequently the same individual Man, wherein per-
haps few are agreed, personal Identity can by us be placed in
nothing but consciousness (which is that alone which makes what
we call self) without involving us in great Absurdities.
Locke Hum II, 27, §21, p. 343