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      §20. But yet possibly it will still be objected, suppose I wholly
lose the memory of some parts of my Life, beyond a possibility of
retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them
again; yet am I not the same Person, that did those Actions, had
those Thoughts, that I was once conscious of, though I have now
forgot them? To which I answer, that we must here take notice
what the Word I is applied to, which in this case is the Man only.
And the same Man being presumed to be the same Person, I is
easily here supposed to stand also for the same Person. But if it
be possible for the same Man to have distinct incommunicable
consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same Man would
at different times make different Persons; which, we see, is the
Sense of Mankind in the solemnest Declaration of their Opinions,
Humane Laws not punishing the Mad Man for the Sober Man’s
Actions, nor the Sober Man for what the Mad Man did, thereby
making them two Persons; which is somewhat explained by our
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way of speaking in English, when we say such an one is not himself or
is besides himself; in which Phrases it is insinuated, as if those who
now, or, at least, first used them, thought, that self was changed,
the self same Person was no longer in that Man.
Locke Hum II, 27, §20, pp. 342-343