— 340 —
      §15. And thus we may be able without any difficulty to con-
ceive, the same Person at the Resurrection, though in a Body not
exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the same
consciousness going along with the Soul that inhabits it. But yet
the Soul alone in the change of Bodies, would scarce to any one, but
to him that makes the Soul the Man, be enough to make the same
Man. For should the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the con-
sciousness of the Prince’s past Life, enter and inform the Body of a
Cobler as soon as deserted by his own Soul, every one sees, he
would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable only for the
Prince’s Actions: But who would say it was the same Man? The
Body too goes to the making the Man, and would, I guess, to every
Body determine the Man in this case, wherein the Soul, with all its
Princely Thoughts about it, would not make another Man: But he
would be the same Cobler to every one besides himself. I know that
in the ordinary way of speaking, the same Person, and the same
Man, stand for one and the same thing. And indeed every one will
always have a liberty to speak, as he pleases, and to apply what
articulate Sounds to what Ideas he thinks fit, and change them as
often as he pleases. But yet when we will enquire, what makes the
same Spirit, Man, or Person, we must fix the Ideas of Spirit, Man, or
Person, in our Minds; and having resolved with our selves what we
mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them,
or the like, when it is the same, and when not.
Locke Hum II, 27, §15, p. 340