— 337 —
Whether in the change of thinking Substances.       §12. But the Question is, whether if the same Substance, which
thinks, be changed, it can be the same person, or remaining the
same, it can be different Persons.
      And to this I answer first, this can be no Question at all to those,
who place Thought in a purely material, animal, Constitution, void
of an immaterial substance. For, whether their Supposition be true
or no, ’tis plain they conceive personal Identity preserved in some-
thing else than Identity of Substance; as animal Identity is pre-
served in Identity of Life, and not of Substance. And therefore those,
who place thinking in an immaterial Substance only, before they
can come to deal with these Men, must shew why personal Identity
cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial Substances, or
variety of particular immaterial Substances, as well as animal
Identity is preserved in the change of material Substances, or variety
of particular Bodies: Unless they will say, ’tis one immaterial Spirit,
that makes the same Life in Brutes; as it is one immaterial Spirit
that makes the same Person in Men, which the Cartesians at least
will not admit, for fear of making Brutes thinking things too.
Locke Hum II, 27, §12, p. 337