— 316 —
Recapitulation.       §37. And thus we have seen, what kind of Ideas we have of Sub-
stances of all kinds, wherein they consist, and how we come by them.
From whence, I think, it is very evident.
      First, That all our Ideas of the several sorts of Substances, are
nothing but Collections of simple Ideas, with a Supposition of
something, to which they belong, and in which they subsist; though
of this supposed something, we have no clear distinct Idea at all.
      Secondly, That all the simple Ideas, that thus united in one com-
mon Substratum make up our complex Ideas of the several sorts of
Substances, are no other but such, as we have received from
Sensation or Reflection. So that even in those, which we think, we are
— 317 —
most intimately acquainted with, and come nearest the Compre-
hension of, our most enlarged Conceptions, cannot reach beyond
those simple Ideas. And even in those, which seem most remote
from all we have to do with, and do infinitely surpass any thing, we
can perceive in our selves by Reflection, or discover by Sensation
in other things, we can attain to nothing, but those simple Ideas,
which we originally received from Sensation or Reflection, as is evi-
dent in the complex Ideas we have of Angels, and particularly of
God himself.
      Thirdly, That most of the simple Ideas, that make up our complex
Ideas of Substances, when truly considered, are only Powers, how-
ever we are apt to take them for positive Qualities; v.g. the greatest
part of the Ideas, that make our complex Idea of Gold, are Yellowness,
great Weight, Ductility, Fusibility, and Solubility, in Aqua Regia,
etc. all united together in an unknown Substratum; all which Ideas, are
nothing else, but so many relations to other Substances; and are not
really in the Gold, considered barely in it self, though they depend
on those real, and primary Qualities of its internal constitution,
whereby it has a fitness, differently to operate, and be operated on
by several other Substances.
Locke Hum II, 23, §37, pp. 316-317