— 313 —
We know nothing beyond our simples Ideas.       §32. Which we are not at all to wonder at, since we having but
some few superficial Ideas of things, discovered to us only by the
Senses from without, or by the Mind, reflecting on what it experi-
ments in it self within, have no Knowledge beyond that, much less
of the internal Constitution, and true Nature of things, being
destitute of Faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and
— 314 —
discovering in our selves Knowledge, and the power of voluntary
Motion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover in things without
us, the cohesion and separation of solid Parts, which is the Exten-
sion and Motion of Bodies; we have as much Reason to be satisfied with our
Notion of immaterial Spirit, as with our Notion of Body; and the Existence
of the one, as well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction,
that Thinking should exist, separate, and independent from
Solidity; than it is a contradiction, that Solidity should exist,
separate, and independent from Thinking, they being both but
simple Ideas, independent one from another; and having as clear and
distinct Ideas in us of Thinking, as of Solidity, I know not, why
we may not as well allow a thinking thing without Solidity, i.e.
immaterial, to exist; as a solid thing without Thinking, i.e. Matter, to
exist; especially since it is no harder to conceive how Thinking
should exist without Matter, than how Matter should think. For
whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple Ideas, we have
from Sensation and Reflection, and dive farther into the Nature
of Things, we fall presently into Darkness and Obscurity, Per-
plexedness and Difficulties; and can discover nothing farther, but
our own Blindness and Ignorance. But which ever of these complex
Ideas be clearest, that of Body, or immaterial Spirit, this is evident,
that the simple Ideas that make them up, are no other than what we
have received from Sensation or Reflection; and so is it of all our
other Ideas of Substances, even of God himself.
Locke Hum II, 23, §32, pp. 313-314