— 247 —
The Will determined by something without it.       §25. Since then it is plain, that in most cases a Man is not at
liberty, whether he will Will, or no; the next thing demanded is,
Whether a Man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, Motion or
Rest. This Question carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in it
self, that one might thereby sufficiently be convinced, that Liberty
concerns not the Will. For to ask, whether a Man be at liberty to
will either Motion, or Rest; Speaking, or Silence; which he pleases,
is to ask, whether a Man can will, what he wills; or be pleased with
what he is pleased with. A Question, which, I think, needs no
answer: and they, who can make a Question of it, must suppose one
Will to determine the Acts of another, and another to determinate
that; and so on in infinitum.
Locke Hum II, 21, §25, p. 247